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Part Performance and the Putative Secured Creditor 
 
In Dinh v Dang [2007] QSC 3, Chesterman J was faced with an unusual situation 
arising from lending transactions that were entirely oral. 
 
Facts 
 
The parties to the litigation were related by marriage (the respondent and the 
applicant’s wife being sisters) and were Vietnamese.  It was noted by 
Chesterman J that there was distrust by the parties and their families of the 
banking institutions in this country and a dislike for the ordinary processes of 
recording business transactions. 
 
The respondent’s case was that she lent her sister, the applicant’s wife, two 
significant sums of money.  The respondent alleged that these sums were 
secured by a charge, or mortgage, over the applicant’s land which was the 
matrimonial home of Mr and Mrs Dinh.  As mentioned, there was no writing which 
evidenced the charge or mortgage.  On 18 November 2004 the respondent 
lodged a caveat over the land claiming ‘an equitable interest as mortgagee of an 
estate in fee simple.’  Some two (2) years after the caveat was lodged, the 
applicant sought an order pursuant to s 127 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) that 
the caveat be removed. 
 
The applicant accepted that some monies were lent but asserted that there had 
been repayment in full.  The applicant denied that the matrimonial home was 
charged with the obligation to repay the loans and, on those grounds sought an 
order that the caveat be removed.  For the respondent, it was claimed that there 
were acts of part performance taking the case beyond the operation of s 59 of 
the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) such that the equitable mortgage could be 
enforced notwithstanding a lack of writing. 
 
Decision 
 
In the result, Chesterman J found the alleged caveatable interest to be without 
substance.  There was nothing in the way of part performance of the claimed 
equitable mortgage sufficient to overcome the operation of s 59 of the Property 
Law Act 1974 (Qld).  The following extract from the decision is reproduced at 
length as it provides useful guidance concerning those acts that may be required 
to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of part performance in the context of 
an equitable mortgage: 
 It must be understood that the respondent’s case is that she is a secured lender to the 
applicant.  The interest which she asserts gives her an interest over the applicant’s land 
is that of equitable mortgagee.  It is not enough that she alleges, and perhaps proves, 
that she lent money to the applicant.  She must prove that the applicant contracted to 
mortgage his land to secure the repayment of the loan and that the respondent partly 
performed that contract. 
 Whether conduct by a plaintiff seeking to enforce an oral contract for an interest in land 
can amount to part performance depends upon whether the acts are ‘unequivocally and 
in their own nature, referable to some such agreement as that alleged’: per Lord Selborne 
in Maddison v Alderson (1888) 8 App Cas 467 at 469.  This test ‘has been consistently 
accepted as a correct statement to the law’: Per Gibbs J (with whom the other members 
of the court agreed) in Regent v Millett (1976) 133 CLR 679 at 683.  The acts relied upon 
must be unequivocally and in their own nature referable to some contract of the general 
nature of that alleged: see McBride v Sandland (1918) 25 CLR 69 at 78. 
 By ‘some such agreement as that alleged’ is meant some contract of the general nature 
of that alleged, some agreement for the disposition of some interest in the land in 
question: see Cooney v Burns (1922) 30 CLR 216 at 222. 
 These statements of principle form an insuperable barrier to the respondent.  The acts of 
part performance relied upon do not point, even equivocally, to the disposition of an 
interest in land.  Debts are commonplace things, as are secured debts.  The advance of 
money and demand for its repayment do not point in any degree to a promise to 
encumber land with the obligation to repay the debt.  An indication by a debtor that he will 
sell property to raise the money to repay the loan is no indication that his property was 
charged with the repayment.  It would be different if the creditor went into possession of 
the land to secure his repayment but nothing of that sort is alleged here.  There is no 
more than a demand for repayment and a promise to make it. 
 It was pointed out in Maddison (at 480) that acts recognised as part performance ‘have 
been (almost, if not quite, universally) relative to the possession, use, or tenure of the 
land’.  The payment of money by itself is insufficient to amount to an act of part 
performance though it may take on that complexion if accompanied by other conduct, but 
here there is no more than a demand for repayment and a promise to make it. 
 In Francis v Francis [1952] VLR 321 there was an agreement for a loan, an advance of 
money, documents of title delivered to the lender and an oral agreement made to give a 
legal mortgage as security.  This was sufficient to amount to acts of part performance but 
the critical feature was the delivery of documents of title.  Without some act of that 
character there is nothing to give the transaction a semblance of a secured loan as 
opposed to an unsecured one. ([16] –[21]) 
Comment 
 
This decision highlights the difficulties inherent where loan arrangements are not 
reduced into writing and the limitations of the equitable doctrine of part 
performance where a putative secured lender fails to take any steps that can be 
seen to be unequivocally referable to a secured lending transaction.  In this 
instance, the parties dislike for the ordinary processes of recording transactions 
became the catalyst for litigation which may otherwise have been avoided. 
 
 
 
BD 
